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Executive Summary 
 
Civil servants are central to effective governance in developing countries. They deliver 
essential services to citizens, commission infrastructure, regulate economic activity 
and engage in diplomacy with foreign countries – to name just a few tasks. This puts a 
premium on understanding how to manage civil servants in developing countries 
effectively. Yet, to-date, there are scarcely any quantitative studies which deliver 
robust findings across developing countries – let alone regions – on what works in civil 
service management. To address this gap, this report draws on data from an original 
survey of 23,000 civil servants in ten countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America – the, to our knowledge, largest original cross-country survey of civil 
servants ever conducted in the developing world. 
Drawing on this data, the report assesses the effects of a range of civil service 
management practices – from recruitment to promotion, pay and performance 
management practices – on the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. To 
understand the desirability of these practices, our survey covers a spectrum of civil 
servant attitudes and behaviour which are core to civil service effectiveness: work 
motivation, job satisfaction, public service motivation, commitment to remaining in the 
public sector, performance and integrity. With these indicators, we can identify which 
civil service management practices tend to have positive effects and which do not – 
thus providing a foundation for evidence-based civil service reform designs. 
What can be learned from the data? First of all, that effects of civil service 
management practices need to be understood within countries and institutions. The 
attitudes and behaviour of civil servants sharply vary across and within countries and 
institutions. The resulting pattern bears little resemblance to conventional wisdoms 
about developing country states. Many prior studies had construed them as 
dichotomies between ‘islands of excellence’ and seas of mediocrity. Top performers 
and basket cases certainly exist in our data. Most institutions, however, are neither. 
Instead, they sit in between. Gradual differences rather than dichotomies between 
poor and strong performance mark most institutions in developing country civil 
services.  
Moreover, institutions (and civil servants) which score highly in one attitude or 
behaviour (e.g. work motivation) often do not do so in another (e.g. commitment of 
civil servants to remain in public sector). Institutions may thus have strengths in some 
dimensions of civil servant behaviour and attitudes, while having weaknesses in 
others. 
These findings underscore that civil service reforms ultimately require tailoring to the 
realities of each institution – and, at times, the realities of each unit or group of 
professionals within institutions. To tailor to local realities thereby requires an 
“Civil service 
reforms require 
tailoring to the 
realities of each 
institution”  
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understanding of both existing civil service management practices in an institution, 
and of the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants that are being shaped by them (for 
instance via staff surveys). Country-level one-size-fits-all civil service reform programs 
would do well to keep this in mind. 
Once these local realities are understood, reforms can be tailored to them. Of course, 
a panoply of reforms might be effective in any given context. Notwithstanding, our 
survey identified four reforms which had positive effects in most of the countries we 
studied. In other words, they tended to lead to more motivated, committed, satisfied, 
performing and ethical civil servants: 1 
 
#1: Depoliticize civil service management 
Having political connections matters for the recruitment, promotion and pay of a 
significant minority of civil servants across all surveyed countries. Its incidence is 
associated with lower work motivation, job dissatisfaction, public service demotivation, 
poor performance and corruption of civil servants. This underscores the importance of 
civil service de-politicization. How can de-politicization be attained? The data suggests 
that formally meritocratic civil service management practices – such as oral and 
written exams to recruit civil servants and consistent advertisements for positions – 
are one important set of practices.  
#2: Curb nepotism in civil service management 
As with political connections, having personal connections inside the state helps a 
significant minority of civil servants obtain recruitment, promotions and pay rises 
across countries studied. In fact, the incidence of personal connections is more 
widespread than politicization. Our data shows it is equally pernicious, adversely 
affecting the work motivation, job satisfaction, public service motivation, performance 
and integrity of civil servants. Curbing the incidence of personal connections 
(nepotism) in civil service management thus constitutes a second reform priority. 
Formally meritocratic civil service management practices – such as public 
advertisements of positions and written exams – are, on average (though not always) 
effective in doing so. 
#3: Ensure that performance matters in civil service management 
Civil services vary significantly in the extent to which performance is perceived by civil 
servants to matter for their promotion, pay and dismissal prospects. Contrary to 
popular stereotypes, civil servants are more satisfied with greater perceived 
performance orientation in civil service management; they are also more committed 
and, at times, motivated to serve the public, work hard and perform. Making sure that 
performance matters in civil service management decisions thus brings important 
                                               
1 Many civil service reforms beyond these four may, of course, be beneficial in any given 
country. We selected these four given their relatively consistent effects across countries.  
“Four civil 
service 
management 
practices had 
positive effects 
in almost all 
surveyed 
countries: 
depoliticization, 
curbing 
nepotism, 
ensuring that 
performance 
matters, and 
paying 
sufficiently to 
retain motivated 
staff.”  
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payoffs. Formal performance management practices – such as performance 
evaluations – can foster perceptions of performance orientation. However, they can 
also achieve the opposite. For example, where performance objectives are not 
identified beforehand and evaluation results are not perceived by civil servants to 
matter for their promotion, pay and promotion prospects, evaluations have 
counterproductive effects. Formal performance management systems thus need to be 
designed and implemented well to have positive effects. Where they are not, they 
achieve the opposite – and, with it, more dissatisfied and demotivated civil servants. 
#4: Pay enough to retain (more) motivated civil servants 
Most civil servants in our surveyed countries are relatively dissatisfied with their pay 
and do not find it sufficient to maintain their households. Yet, most would also find it 
hard to find a better-paid private sector job. Judging from our sample, salaries thus 
appear competitive for many civil servants in developing countries, even if they are 
perceived as unsatisfactory and insufficient. Notwithstanding, these perceptions 
matter. Higher pay satisfaction and sufficiency are associated with greater job 
satisfaction and intent to remain in the public sector – but not (directly) greater work 
motivation and performance. Higher pay – through its effect on pay satisfaction – 
however can drive motivation and performance indirectly: by discouraging departures 
of more motivated and performing staff, who, according to our data, (also) find it easier 
to get better-paid private sector jobs. This puts a premium on paying enough to retain 
motivated and performing staff. Where retention (and attraction) of motivated and 
performing staff is not a challenge, however, higher pay may do little to boost 
motivation and performance.  
Our four lessons thus underscore the importance of meritocratic personnel 
management practices, sufficient pay for retention and well-designed and 
implemented performance management systems. They also suggest reformers should 
only introduce performance systems where they are confident they can design and 
implement them well. For long-standing civil service reformers, these lessons might 
not be news. Advocates of Weberian bureaucracies have long argued for meritocratic 
personnel practices to curb politicization and nepotism; and managerial reform 
proponents have long advocated performance management systems to incentivize 
hard work.  
To some extent, this is good news: it suggests that many prior reform prescriptions 
have the potential to improve civil services. It is also bad news, however. Institutions 
frequently do not adopt practices that are statistically associated with more motivated, 
committed and ethical civil servants. This, of course, points to the need to understand 
civil service reform not only as a technical design, but also as a political and 
implementation challenge. Our report principally sought to inform reform design. With 
that said, we hope that the evidence presented on reform effects can also help 
reformers make their case and convince others of the benefits of civil service reform.
“Institutions 
frequently do not 
adopt civil 
service 
management 
practices which 
are associated 
with more 
effective civil 
services.”  
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I. Introduction 
 
Making civil services work: an international research project 
 
Civil servants are central to effective governance in developing countries. They deliver 
essential services to citizens, commission large-scale infrastructure, regulate 
economic activity and engage in diplomacy with foreign countries – to name just a few 
roles. Yet, in many developing countries, civil servants do not consistently take on 
these roles effectively. Instead, civil services are marked by service delivery failures 
and corruption. In response, donor organizations and governments in developing 
countries have recurrently sought to reform civil services. The World Bank (2008), for 
instance, lent US$422m per year for this purpose between 2000 and 2006. The track 
record of these reforms has been far from stellar, however. The World Bank’s lending, 
for instance, had no measurable impact on civil services (World Bank, 2008). Other 
aid organizations raise similar concerns (e.g. DFID, 2011). 
One important hindrance to reform has been the absence of rigorous evidence on 
how to manage civil servants effectively in developing country contexts. In fact, some 
observers go as far as noting that “we do not really know what we are doing” in civil 
service reform (Brösamle, 2012). While this might be an exaggeration in light of some 
recent studies (see e.g. Rogger, 2017), it is clear that, to-date, there are scarcely any 
quantitative studies which deliver robust findings across developing countries – let 
alone regions – on what works in civil service management in developing countries.  
This report seeks to help address this gap. It draws on results from the – to our 
knowledge – largest original cross-country survey of civil servants conducted to-date, 
with responses from 23,000 civil servants in ten countries in four developing regions: 
Ghana, Malawi, Uganda, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Albania, Kosovo, Bangladesh and 
Nepal. The underlying research project was led by Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling 
(University of Nottingham) and Christian Schuster (University College London) and 
“This report 
draws on the 
largest original 
international 
survey of civil 
servants to-date, 
with over 23,000 
respondents in 
ten countries in 
four developing 
regions.” 
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funded by a grant from the British Academy – UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme.  
Our cross-country survey gathers data on civil servants’ experiences and perceptions 
of civil service management practices on the one hand, and civil servants’ attitudes 
and behaviour on the other. The civil service management practices covered in the 
survey include recruitment, pay, promotion, performance evaluation and career 
management of civil servants. Concurrently, the survey captures a broad spectrum of 
attitudes and behaviour of civil servants – their work motivation, job satisfaction, public 
service motivation, commitment to remain in the public sector, performance and 
integrity.  
Thanks to data on both management practices and attitudes and behaviour, a 
statistical analysis can provide guidance on which management practices have 
positive (or negative) effects on the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants, after 
controlling for a range of other factors.  
We hope this analysis provides an evidence basis and starting point for governments 
and donors hoping to design improvements in civil service management.2  
The survey of civil servants  
The survey focused principally on surveying civil servants in the administrative arm of 
central government, including officials in government ministries, subordinated 
organizations of ministries and executive agencies. In other words, the survey 
sampled respondents in the ‘civil service’ in its most common colloquial usage.3 As a 
result, the survey did not extend to teachers, medical personnel, policemen or the 
military. The survey aimed to include civil servants from all ranks and hence from the 
                                               
2 This report is based on cross-sectional analyses of perception-based survey data, which can 
provide important insights, but is not without limitations. As such, we hope that its findings are 
treated as a basis to discuss potential improvements to civil service management practices – 
rather than a be-all and end-all guide to civil service reform. 
3 Legally, the scope of civil services varies across countries. To ensure comparable samples, 
we did not follow legal definitions but rather the aforementioned common usage of the ‘civil 
service’ in our survey sampling. 
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top to the bottom of the administrative hierarchy. Most surveyed civil servants were 
employed in the capital city of the respective countries.    
The survey was conducted with authorization and support from central governments in 
the ten countries. How institutions and civil servants were sampled within the civil 
service in each country varied somewhat, due to differences in the survey mode, 
scope of government support and availability of survey population data.    
In five countries, respondents completed the survey online, based on governments 
holding email records of civil servants. In three of these countries, the survey was sent 
to all ‘civil servants’ (Kosovo, Estonia and Albania), except officials employed in 
defense ministries and their subordinated organizations. In two of these countries, the 
survey was sent to all civil servants in eleven (Chile) and fourteen (Brazil) central 
government institutions. Response rates varied across countries (see Appendix A.1). 
To enhance representativeness and subject to data availability, a subset of our 
country reports includes survey weights (see, e.g., Schuster, Meyer-Sahling, 
Mikkelsen, Gonzalez Parrao, 2017). 
In the five remaining countries, the survey was conducted in-person. Civil servants 
were selected through informal quota sampling and chain referral, with a view to 
obtaining responses from civil servants in a variety of positions, institutions and 
functions. The survey thereby extended to 48 (Ghana), 31 (Uganda), 62 (Malawi), 31 
(Nepal) and 38 (Bangladesh) state institutions. Appendix A.1 contains further detail on 
survey sampling and response rates.  
The cross-country survey was translated (and, at times, back-translated) into local 
languages where necessary. To ensure a comparable understanding of the wording of 
our questions across our diverse range of countries and languages, the survey was 
pre-tested in each country through a series of cognitive interviews with public 
servants. The survey was iteratively revised in each country until cognitive interviews 
with public servants suggested measures were understood as intended  
. 
“Our statistical 
analyses can 
provide 
guidance on 
which 
management 
practices tend to 
have positive (or 
negative) effects 
on the attitudes 
and behaviour of 
civil servants.” 
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The survey sample implies that our survey data can provide detailed insights into civil 
servants in a wide range of positions and institutions in four different developing 
regions.  To illustrate, table 1 contains basic demographic data on our respondents. 
Our respondents are virtually balanced in terms of gender; have, on average, over 13 
years of experience in the public sector; are roughly 43 years old; are distributed 
across levels of the administrative hierarchy, with a majority in technical-professional 
positions; and tend to be university educated and on permanent contracts (with one in 
five being on temporary contracts and not having a university degree, however). 
While our survey thus covers a range of civil servants, institutions and countries, our 
findings are not necessarily representative for each of the countries studied. Survey 
mode and respondent sampling varied in each country, and we could not obtain data 
to construct survey weights across countries. As a result, cross-country comparisons 
in particular should thus be interpreted with care. They are only suggestive. 
 
Table 1. Demographics of survey respondents 
  Proportion of civil servants in 
survey sample  
Gender Female 51% 
Male 49% 
Education No University Degree 20% 
University Degree 80% 
Age Average number of years 42.8 years 
Rank in hierarchy Administrative Support 23% 
Technical-professional 60% 
Manager 17% 
Years of experience  Average number of years 13.3 years 
Contract Type Permanent 77% 
Temporary 23% 
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Structure of the report 
After this introduction, chapter 2 of this report delves into data about civil servants 
themselves: their motivation to work hard, performance, job satisfaction, public service 
motivation, commitment to remain in the public sector and integrity. It draws on this 
data to derive lessons about the nature of civil servants in developing countries. This 
data challenges conventional wisdoms about developing country civil services, for 
instance the notion that civil services consist of islands of excellence in seas of 
mediocrity. The chapter concludes with implications of these lessons for civil service 
reform approaches. 
Chapter 3 turns to the core purpose of this report: what works in civil service 
management? To shed light on this question, regression evidence is presented on the 
effects of civil service management practices on the motivation, performance, 
satisfaction, commitment and integrity of civil servants. The chapter derives four core 
lessons about how to make civil services in developing countries work based on this 
analysis. These lessons are structured around civil service management practices 
which have positive effects in all or most of the ten countries surveyed.  
The report concludes in chapter 4 with implications and policy recommendations for a 
more motivated, committed and ethical civil service in developing countries.  
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II. The nature of civil servants in developing 
countries 
 
Four core insights about the nature of civil servants – their job-related attitudes 
and behaviour, including job satisfaction, work motivation, commitment to public 
service, performance and integrity – can be drawn from the data: 
 
#1: The attitudes of civil servants are dynamic: they progress over time 
#2: Good attitudes need not coincide: civil servants and institutions which score 
high in one attitude or behaviour (e.g. motivation to serve the public) need not 
score high in another (e.g. motivation to work hard).  
#3: Attitudes and behaviour vary sharply across and within countries and 
institutions; at times, groups within institutions will differ more sharply in their 
attitudes than the average civil servant across countries.  
#4: Most institutions are neither ‘islands of excellence’ nor basket cases. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, they are instead situated on a gradual slope between 
excellence and mediocrity.  
 
For civil service reformers, the first finding is good news: if attitudes of civil 
servants are dynamic, they can be shaped by civil service reforms. Findings 2 to 
4 caution attention, however, to trade-offs and local contexts. As good attitudes 
need not coincide, reforms can foster some at the expense of others; and, as 
attitudes vary sharply between and within institutions, the effects of management 
practices might plausibly do so as well. Reforms thus need to be tailored to the 
realities of each institution. Understanding the attitudes and behaviour of civil 
servants (which reforms, ultimately, seek to shape) should thus be the first step in 
any civil service reform.  
 
 
What it takes to make civil services work: desirable attitudes 
and behaviour of civil servants 
Our survey captured a range of dimensions which are both intuitively and empirically 
associated with better working civil services: job satisfaction, public sector 
commitment, public service motivation, work motivation, performance and integrity 
(figure 1). Appendix A.2 contains the indicators used to measure each of these 
attitudes and behaviour.  
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Figure 1. Attitudes and behaviour of effective civil servants 
 
 
These are, of course, by no means the only desirable attitudes and behaviour of civil 
servants. However, they are all attitudes and behaviour, which, according to prior 
studies, matter for civil service effectiveness. Job satisfaction, a commitment to remain 
in the public sector, work motivation, public service motivation and individual job 
performance have all been associated with greater organizational performance (see 
e.g. Cantarelli, Belardinelli & Belle, 2016; Kim, 2004; Ritz, 2009); as have integrity – 
including (lower) corruption, clientelism and nepotism (see e.g. Gould and Amaro-
Reyes, 1983).  
They also reflect a wide spectrum of civil service attitudes and behaviour. Thanks to 
cross-country data on this wide spectrum, this report can identify several insights 
about the nature of civil servants in developing countries, which studies focused on 
single dependent variables or countries could often not.  
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Insight #1: The attitudes of civil servants are dynamic 
Our data suggests, first, that how motivated, committed, satisfied and ethical civil 
servants are varies significantly over time in public service. To illustrate, figures 2 to 3 
plot the average job satisfaction and preference for remaining in the public sector 
(public sector commitment) of civil servants in our sample by years of experience.  
 
     Figure 2. Job Satisfaction (0-6 scale) by years of experience in public service 
 
 
The figures suggest that these attitudes are dynamic. Average job satisfaction and 
public sector commitment fall significantly in the first five years in public service, and 
only recover to initial levels after 15 to 20 years of service. They reach their peaks 
shortly before retirement. Public sector turnover – with the most dissatisfied staff 
leaving – might well explain the recovery after five years; it does not provide a 
convincing explanation for the initial fall, however. These shifts are also not merely 
Pg. 09 
 
The nature of public servants in developing countries  
   
 
due to coincidence of age and years of experience of civil servants. As illustrated in 
Appendix B, public sector commitment hardly changes with age. In other words, 
attitudes and behaviour do appear to shift with years of experience. 
As illustrated in Appendix B (figures b2 and b3), this dynamic nature is observable 
across countries. For instance, the initial slump in job satisfaction occurs across all 
countries with sufficient observations for year-on-year comparisons. The implication of 
this dynamic nature of civil servant attitudes and behaviour is clear: public sector 
organizations can mold them. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of civil servants preferring to work in the public sector by years of 
public service experience 
 
“The attitudes of 
civil servants are 
dynamic; public 
sector 
organizations 
can mold them.” 
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Insight #2: Good attitudes need not coincide: civil servants 
and institutions can score high in one, yet not another 
 
While ‘good’ attitudes and behaviour are all positively related to each other in our 
dataset, most correlations are not large (table 2). Correlations range from r = 0.32 for 
work motivation and performance to r = 0.08 for work motivation and preference to 
remain in the public sector – with the remaining correlations in between. This suggests 
that desirable attitudes and behaviour are more likely than not to coincide; they need 
not do so, however. 
 
Table 2. Correlations between attitudes and behaviour of civil servants 
 
We observe a similar pattern at the institutional level. Some institutions score high in 
some attitudes, but not others. Two rankings of attitudes and behaviour in the 
surveyed state institutions in Chile are illustrative. Figure 4 compares the proportion of 
civil servants who would prefer continuing to work in the public sector (over a private 
sector job). Figure 5 compares the self-assessed performance of civil servants. There 
is significant movement of institutions between the rankings. The civil service agency 
(DNSC) scores among the top 3 institutions in terms of the preference of staff to 
continue to working in the public sector, yet among the bottom 3 in (self-assessed) 
performance, for instance. Institutions may thus have strengths in some dimensions of 
behaviour and attitudes of civil servants, yet not others. 
 
 
 
 Job Satisfaction Performance 
Public Service 
Motivation 
Work 
Motivation 
Public Sector 
Commitment 
 
Job Satisfaction 1.00 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.21 
 
Performance 0.16 1.00 0.19 0.32 0.11 
 
Public Service 
Motivation 
             0.08 0.19 1.00 0.22 0.08 
 
Work Motivation 0.12 0.32 0.22 1.00 0.08 
 
Public Sector 
Commitment 
0.21 0.11 0.08 0.08 1.00 
“Institutions can 
have strengths 
in some 
attitudes and 
behaviour of civil 
servants, yet 
weaknesses in 
others.” 
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Figure 4. Proportion of civil servants preferring to work in the public sector by state 
institution in Chile 
 
  
Figure 5. (Self-assessed) performance by state institution in Chile 
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Good attitudes and behaviour thus need not coincide, both for individual civil servants 
and for state institutions. If they do not go together, however, then the desirability of 
civil service management practices depends on how they affect the range relevant 
attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. A core civil service management challenge is 
thus the design of practices which shape the range of attitudes and behaviour of civil 
servants positively – rather than a few at the expense of others. 
 
Insight #3: Attitudes and behaviour vary across and within 
countries and institutions 
 
At the country-level, our survey samples are, as noted, not necessarily representative. 
As such, we can only provide suggestive evidence about descriptive differences 
between countries. With this caveat in mind, we do observe significant cross-country 
variation in attitudes and behaviour. To illustrate, figure 6 shows the average 
proportion of civil servants in each country who are willing to accept money or a 
personal present in exchange for helping someone through their public sector position. 
This is one important measure of corruption intent. To obtain (more) truthful estimates 
of corruption intent, we asked this question in a list experiment (see Appendix A.2). 
Estimates vary between from 0% in a subset of our countries to almost half of civil 
servants (44%) in Malawi. 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of civil servants per country indicating that they are willing to 
engage in corruption 
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We observe similar cross-country variation across our other indicators. As illustrated in 
Appendix B, average job satisfaction, for instance, ranges from less than 3.5 in Brazil 
and Uganda to over 4.5 in Chile (on a scale from 0 to 6). 
 
Importantly, this variation extends not solely to countries. It is also observable across 
institutions within countries – and within individual institutions. To illustrate, Chile is the 
country with the highest job satisfaction on average in our sample. Yet, as illustrated in 
figure 7, six other countries have a higher average job satisfaction than the institution 
with the least job satisfaction in Chile. Within-country variation can thus trump cross-
country differences in the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants.  
 
Figure 7. Job satisfaction by institution in Chile 
  
In fact, even within-institution variation can trump cross-country and cross-institutional 
variation. In Chile’s Treasury, for instance, managers are more satisfied than the 
average civil servant in any other Chilean institution (see Appendix B). At the same 
time, technical-professional staff is less satisfied than the average employee in a 
series of institutions. These differences suggest that civil service reforms would benefit 
from tailoring not only to the realities of each state institution, but also within state 
institutions to the realities of each department or group of civil servants. 
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Insight #4: Most institutions are neither ‘islands of excellence’ 
nor basket cases  
 
When comparing the average attitudes and behaviour of civil servants across 
institutions, the resulting patterns bears little resemblance to conventional wisdoms 
about developing country states. In qualitative and policy publications, these are often 
construed as dichotomies between islands of excellence and seas of mediocrity (see 
e.g. Leonard, 2008; Roll, 2014). Top performers and basket cases certainly exist in 
our data. Most institutions, however, are neither. Instead, they sit in between – on a 
long and gradual slope of increasing or decreasing performance. Gradual differences 
rather than dichotomies between poor and strong performance thus mark developing 
country civil services. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate this pattern with the examples of the 
average job satisfaction and public service motivation for the (several hundred) 
institutions in our sample. We observe it equally for our other indicators. What this 
implies for civil service reforms is discussed next. 
 
Figure 8. Job Satisfaction by institution (all countries; global mean set to zero) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Gradual 
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Figure 9. Public service motivation by institution (all countries; global mean set to zero) 
 
 
 
Implications for civil service reform 
 
What can we learn from these insights about civil service reform? First of all, the 
findings imply that civil service management matters. If attitudes and behaviour of civil 
servants are affected by time in an organization, organizational (and civil service 
management) practices can plausibly shape them. This puts a premium on assessing 
their effects, a task the next chapter takes on. 
 
In assessing the desirability of civil service management practices, however, the data 
point to an important note of caution. This desirability needs to be assessed against a 
large range of attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. Those need not coincide, and 
civil service management practices might thus well come with trade-offs, favourably 
affecting one attitude or behaviour, while adversely affecting another. The next 
chapter thus assesses the effects of civil service management practices on a range of 
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attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. As will be shown, civil service management 
practices often have heterogenous effects. 
 
Finally, the effects of civil service management practices need to be understood within 
countries and institutions. As noted, there is sharp variation in attitudes and behaviour 
across and within countries and institutions – in a pattern which puts a damper on the 
utility of the ‘islands of excellence’ metaphor. In light of the diversity of these attitudes 
and behaviour across and within institutions, the effects of (many) civil service 
management practices are likely to vary. Cookie cutter civil service reforms are thus 
unlikely to be effective. Rather, civil service reforms require tailoring to the realities of 
each institution – and, at times, to the realities of each unit or group of professionals 
within (or across) institutions. Understanding these realities requires an appreciation of 
not only existing management practices, but also the varied attitudes and behaviour of 
civil servants that are being shaped by them (for instance via staff surveys).  
 
The next chapter takes this lesson on board and assesses both cross-country and 
country-specific effects of civil service management practices. Moreover, several of 
the country reports complementing this cross-country report also estimate effects of 
civil service management practices in individual institutions (see, e.g. Schuster, 
Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, Gonzalez Parrao, 2017). The core lessons presented in the 
next chapter are robust in most of these institutional-level analyses.  
 
“Civil service 
reforms can 
require tailoring 
to not only the 
realities of each 
state institution, 
but also within 
state institutions 
the realities of 
each department 
or group of civil 
servants” 
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III. Civil service management in developing 
countries: what works?  
 
 
The data in this chapter points to four core lessons for making civil services work 
in developing countries: 
 
#1: Depoliticize civil service management 
#2: Curb nepotism in civil service management 
#3: Ensure that performance matters in civil service management 
#4: Pay enough to retain (more) motivated civil servants 
 
These are, of course, not the only civil service management practices affecting 
the motivation, satisfaction, performance and integrity of civil servants, nor do 
these outcomes solely result from civil service management practices. 
Nonetheless, our data suggests that they are worthwhile targets for civil service 
reform attempts: we find support for these lessons and their effectiveness in 
almost all of the ten countries studied. 
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Lesson #1: Depoliticize civil service management 
Having political connections matters for the recruitment, promotion and pay of a 
significant minority of civil servants across levels of hierarchy in all surveyed 
countries. The data shows that such politicization of civil service management 
functions adversely affects the work motivation, job satisfaction, public service 
motivation, performance and integrity of civil servants. It also shows that certain 
formally meritocratic civil service management practices – such as oral and written 
exams to recruit civil servants or public advertisements for positions – curb 
politicization. We find that these de-politicizing effects of merit practices hold both 
on average across countries and at the country-level in most surveyed countries. 
The evidence thus both underscores the importance of civil service de-politicization 
to make civil services work and the relevance of formal meritocratic procedures to 
achieve de-politicization.  
 
1.1. Civil service politicization in developing countries: how widespread is it? 
Politicization of the civil service generally refers to ‘the substitution of political criteria 
for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining 
of members of the public service (Peters & Pierre 2004:2). We measured politicization 
in the survey by asking civil servants directly how important it has been for them to 
know a politician or a person with political links to get their first job in the public sector, 
to advance to a better position in the public sector and to get a pay rise.  
Figure 10 reports the proportion of civil servants who indicate that political connections 
were at least somewhat (i.e. not not at all) important for their public sector jobs and 
careers, that is, for their recruitment, pay and promotions.4 It shows that politicization 
is not limited to the top of administrative hierarchies – where legitimate democratic 
concerns with the political control of state institutions might warrant politicization (see 
Kopecky et al., 2016). While politicization is most prevalent at the managerial level 
(25% of civil servants for recruitment, 25% for promotions and 19% for pay), it also 
occurs at the administrative support level (22%, 21% and 15%), and the technical-
                                               
4 Civil servants were asked to rate the importance of knowing a politician or someone with 
political links for recruitment, promotions and pay rises on a scale of 1 to 7. As civil servants 
may underreport the (sensitive) experience of having had political connections in the course of 
their career in the public sector, we report in figure 1 the proportion of civil servants that 
attaches at least some importance – i.e. not none at all – to political connections (scoring at 
least 2 on the scale of 1-7).  
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professional level (18%, 19% and 15%). Politicization thus permeates throughout 
levels of hierarchies. 
 
Figure 10. Proportion of civil servants who obtained their first job (also) thanks to 
political connections, by level of hierarchy 
 
Politicization also matters to some extent in all of the surveyed countries – albeit to a 
greatly varying extent. As illustrated in figure 11, the share of civil servants for whom 
political connections matter for recruitment, promotion and pay respectively vary from 
5%-6% in Estonia to 39%-44% in Kosovo.5  
The politicization of different civil service management functions thereby tends to 
coincide. The politicization of recruitment and promotion is highly correlated (r= 0.79); 
as is the politicization of promotion and pay rises (r = 0.81); and recruitment and pay 
rises (r = 0.73). This suggests that many civil servants who use political connections to 
get a job subsequently also use political connections to get promoted and pay rises 
once inside the state. Or, from the vantage point of authorities, where state institutions 
politicize one civil service management function, they typically also politicize another. 
 
                                               
5 In Chile, the indicator reports the proportion of civil servants who deem political connections 
at least somewhat important for civil servants like them (rather than for the respondents’ own 
recruitment, for instance).  
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Figure 11. Proportion of civil servants who attribute at least some importance to 
political connections for their recruitment, promotion or pay rises 
 
As a caveat, however, this pattern of politicization across civil service management 
functions does not apply equally to all countries. In half of our countries – most notably 
in Bangladesh and, to a lesser extent, also in Albania, Ghana, Nepal and Uganda – 
pay decisions are significantly less politicized than recruitment and promotions. This 
reflects regulated salary systems in countries such as Bangladesh that allow for less 
discretion over pay decisions. As a result, the share of civil servants for whom political 
connections matter for pay rises across countries (15%) is smaller than in the case of 
recruitment (20%) and promotion (20%). While recruitment and promotion are, on 
average, equally politicized, in some countries – in particular Malawi and Ghana – 
recruitment is more politicized than promotion, while in Brazil the opposite occurs. 
Overall, the variation in politicization of civil service management functions suggests 
that management practices – not just connections of civil servants – matter for the 
weight of politicization, and that de-politicization reforms should consider carefully 
which civil service management functions and ranks are politicized – a point we will 
return to further below. 
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In sum, political connections matter for the recruitment, promotion and pay of a 
significant – but varying – number of civil servants across levels of hierarchy and 
countries.  
 
1.2. How does politicization affect the behaviour and attitudes of civil servants? 
How does civil service politicization affect civil servants? Prior studies suggest that the 
politicization of recruitment has negative effects on civil service performance, 
clientelism and corruption (Lewis 2008, Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen 2016, Oliveros & 
Schuster 2017). Politicization can adversely affect the behaviour and attitudes of civil 
servants through several channels (Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen & Schuster, 
forthcoming). Most obviously, where political criteria have weight in personnel 
decisions, competence is no longer (fully) prioritized, with negative consequences for 
performance. Politicization also changes the career incentives of civil servants. 
Responsiveness to political demands becomes the driver of career success – not 
impartial service delivery to the public. Lastly, politicization can change the role 
identity of civil servants. Civil servants become ‘political servants’ who are appointed 
and promoted for their political service to politicians – not public service to society. 
This shifts the sense of obligation of ‘public’ servants towards political superiors and, 
potentially, away from the impartial and lawful exercise of their duties. 
Our data confirms the negative effects of politicization, but provides a broader picture, 
enabling us to assess the effects of the politicization of recruitment, promotion and pay 
on a range of desirable attitudes and behaviour of civil servants across countries. 
Controlling for a range of other factors6, we find that civil servants for whom political 
connections were important for recruitment are less motivated to work hard, less 
motivated to serve the public, less committed to staying in the public sector, less 
performing and less satisfied with their jobs (figure 12). As illustrated in Appendix C 
(figures c1 and c2), we find similar negative effects for the politicization of promotions 
and pay rises. 
 
                                               
6 For all regressions in this report, we run models which control for the gender, age, education, 
level of hierarchy, income (in bands), years of experience in public sector, type of position 
(dummy for contact with citizens) and country of the respondent. As noted above, the resulting 
cross-sectional statistical associations are only suggestive of causal effects. Regression results 
and the precise models (OLS, GLM or logit, for instance) used are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Figure 12. The negative effects of politicized recruitment of civil servants 
 
 
The adverse effects of politicization do not stop at work and public service motivation, 
satisfaction and performance, however. Our data suggests that they also extend to 
integrity. As illustrated in figure 13, civil servants for whom knowing a politician or 
someone with political links has been important for getting their job are more willing to 
accept money or a personal present in exchange for helping someone through their 
public sector position (controlling for the aforementioned factors). They have also 
more frequently done so in the past, and are, in addition, more likely to help the 
election campaign of a political party. In other words, politicization is associated with 
greater corruption and clientelism in the public service (as measured by our list 
experiments; see Appendix A.2). As illustrated in Appendix C, politicized promotions 
and pay rises are, similarly, associated with greater clientelism. These latter results 
are particularly intuitive: civil servants who owe their jobs to politicians are more likely 
to help them in their (re-) election efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
“Politicization of 
civil service 
management 
practices has 
adverse effects 
on work 
motivation, 
performance, 
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Figure 13. The effects of politicized recruitment on the integrity of civil servants 
 
In sum, political connections not only matter in a significant share of civil service 
management decisions. They also negatively affect the behaviour and attitudes of civil 
servants, curbing work and public service motivation, job satisfaction and performance 
while leading to more corruption and clientelism in public service. This puts a premium 
on understanding which civil service management practices can depoliticize civil 
services. This is assessed next. 
 
1.3. Which civil service management practices curb politicization?  
To protect civil service management decisions from undue political interference, 
reformers have typically relied on merit-based civil service management procedures, 
such as public advertisements of public sector jobs, followed by written examinations 
and interviews for entry. Such procedures also figure prominently in the repertoire of 
international aid and assistance organizations (see, for instance, SIGMA 2014). In our 
data, we find that such procedures are frequently – but far from always – used across 
countries. Are such procedures effective in curbing politicization? We find that, on 
average, they are, yet (some) politicization can persist even in their presence.  
As illustrated in figure 14, most public sector jobs in our surveyed civil services appear 
to be advertised. Only a minority of civil servants (27%) has heard about their jobs 
through word of mouth only (rather than some form of wider advertisement). This 
share does reach 41% and 39% in Chile and Estonia respectively, however, 
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suggesting that a potential lack of advertisement precludes citizens in some countries 
from applying to a significant minority of positions. Once applications are received, 
interviews are the most common form of assessment in our surveyed countries (70% 
of civil servants), followed by exams (49% of civil servants).  
For both selection methods, however, there is significant variation across countries. In 
some countries, the use of written examinations is highly common (Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Brazil). In others, written exams are hardly ever used (Estonia and Ghana). 
Similarly, assessing candidates through interviews is highly common in most countries 
(Bangladesh, Malawi, Uganda, Kosovo, Ghana, Estonia and Nepal), but virtually 
absent in Brazil (where, in most institutions, only managerial-rank civil servants are 
interviewed).  
 
Figure 14. Proportion of civil servants hired through formally merit-based recruitment 
and selection procedures, by country 
 
 
Written exams tend to coincide to some extent with job advertisements (r=0.22), while 
the use of exams and interviews (r=-0.03) and job advertisements and interviews 
(r=0.02) is largely unrelated. This reflects that, in the countries in our sample, most 
civil servants apply for advertised jobs and are then assessed through written exams 
or interviews (64%), yet fewer apply for advertised jobs and are then assessed 
through both exams and interviews (28%). A relevant minority of civil servants also 
“Some civil 
servants have 
obtained public 
sector jobs 
which were 
neither 
advertised nor 
assessed 
through an 
interview or 
exam.” 
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entered the public sector through a job, which was not advertised and not assessed 
through either an interview or an exam (6%), or advertised but not assessed through 
an exam or interview (15%).  
To what extent are these formal merit procedures effective in curbing politicization in 
the civil service? Figure 15 suggests that formal procedures – advertisements of 
public sector jobs, written examinations and interviews – can curb politicization. Both 
written examinations and interviews are associated with less importance of political 
connections in recruitment. to the effect of job advertisements is substantively even 
larger, which underscores the importance of advertising job opportunities in the public 
sector – rather than merely disseminating them through word of mouth. 
 
Figure 15. Effects of advertisements, written examinations and interviews on the 
politicization of recruitment  
 
 
Formal merit procedures are effective in curbing civil service politicization not only on 
average, but also in almost all of the countries studied. As figure 16 illustrates, exams 
exert a negative effect on politicization in 8 of the 10 countries studied (with one 
negative effect not being significant); interviews exert a significant negative effect in 6 
of the 10 countries studied (and are only statistically significantly positively associated 
“Consistently 
advertising 
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with more politicization in one country); and job advertisements, similarly, are 
associated with less politicization in 6 out of 10 countries (the two positive effects are 
not significant).  
 
Figure 16. Effects of advertisements, written examinations and interviews on the 
politicization of recruitment   
 
In short, formal merit procedures are frequently – but far from always – used across 
countries. On average and in most countries studied, they tend to curb politicization. 
Particularly countries with high levels of politicization would thus benefit from 
expanding formal merit safeguards – consistently advertising positions for recruitment 
and promotion, and assessing civil servants through exams and/or interviews for 
recruitment and promotion.  
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Lesson #2: Curb Nepotism in Civil Service Management  
Having personal connections inside the state (nepotism) matters for the recruitment, 
promotion and pay rises of a significant minority of civil servants across levels of 
hierarchy and countries studied. In fact, nepotism is more widespread than 
politicization. Our data shows that it is equally pernicious: it adversely affects the 
work motivation, job satisfaction, public service motivation, performance and 
integrity of civil servants. As with politicization, certain formally meritocratic civil 
service management practices – such as oral and written exams to recruit civil 
servants or public advertisements for positions – curb nepotism – both on average 
and in most countries studied. In fact, they tend to have larger effects on reducing 
nepotism than on reducing politicization. The evidence thus both underscores the 
importance of curbing nepotism to make civil services work, and the relevance of 
formal meritocratic procedures to rid civil service management in developing 
countries of nepotism. 
 
2.1. Nepotism in civil service management in developing countries: how 
widespread is it? 
That personal networks frequently play roles in hiring decisions is well-established 
(see, classically, Granovetter 1973). A significant number of jobs in private companies 
is found through referrals, for instance. Some companies explicitly seek out referral-
based hiring. It can, for instance, speed up recruitment and reduce information gaps 
about applicants, particularly about hard to observe characteristics such as cultural fit 
(Dineva, Holbrook & Geshuri, 2015). Personal networks can thus play legitimate roles 
in hiring decisions. However, an excessive reliance on them can turn into nepotism: 
favouritism in recruitment, promotion and pay decisions towards family members, 
friends and other personnel connections inside the state. This risk is particularly acute 
in developing countries with neo-patrimonial regimes, and thus personal connection-
based rule as a characteristic feature (Erdman & Engel 2007, Guliyev 2011).  
Personal favouritism – like political favouritism (politicization) – can be expected to 
have adverse effects on civil servants’ attitudes and behaviour. Professional 
competence is de-prioritized, with potential adverse effects on performance. Career 
incentives are skewed away from hard work towards cultivating personal networks. 
And the identities of civil servants may shift from servants of society to servants of the 
networks who helped them obtain their jobs or pay rises – with potentially adverse 
effects on civil service impartiality and integrity. Whether the ‘personalization’ of civil 
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service management practices, in fact, has adverse effects is empirically explored 
further below. This section first provides evidence for its widespread reach. 
In our survey, we measured personalization analogously to politicization: we asked 
civil servants how important friends, family members or other personal connections 
have been for them to get their first job in the public sector, to advance to a better 
position and to get a pay rise.7 We find that, on average, 41% of civil servants got their 
first job (at least in part) thanks to personal connections; for 34% of civil servants, they 
were at least somewhat important for obtaining promotions; and for 22% they 
mattered for pay rises. 
As with politicization, personal connections matter for recruitment, promotion and pay 
decisions across the hierarchy (figure 17). Almost half (48%) of administrative support 
staff indicates that personal connections were (at least somewhat) important for their 
recruitment (and 34% and 21% indicate they matter for their promotion and pay). 
Similarly, almost half (44%) of managerial staff assigns importance to personal 
connections for their recruitment (and 41% and 24% for promotion and pay 
respectively). Personal connections matter relatively less at the technical-professional 
level, but are still relevant for the recruitment (36%), promotion (31%) and pay rises 
(22%) of a significant minority of professional-technical staff.  
                                               
7 Civil servants were asked to rate the importance of having friends, family or other 
acquaintances in the public sector for having obtained their first job, for promotions and for pay 
rises on a scale of 1 to 7. As civil servants may underreport the (sensitive) experience of 
having had personal connections to get a job, promotions or pay increases, we report in figure 
2 the proportion of civil servants that attaches at least some importance to personal 
connections (scoring at least 2 on the scale of 1-7). 
“Four out of 
every ten civil 
servants in our 
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Figure 17. Proportion of civil servants who obtained their first job (also) thanks to 
personal connections inside the state, by level of hierarchy 
 
Personal connections matter not only throughout hierarchies but also across countries 
– but to a greatly varying extent. Personal connections matter in the recruitment of 
most civil servants in Nepal (76%), for instance, but only a small minority of 
(managerial) civil servants in Brazil (19%). Similarly, they matter for the promotion of a 
majority (52%) of civil servants in Kosovo, yet for only a small minority (17%) in 
Uganda; and for the pay rises of a large minority of civil servants in Kosovo (42%), yet 
only for a minor share (5%) of civil servants in Bangladesh. 
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Figure 18. Proportion of civil servants who attribute at least some importance to 
personal connections for their recruitment, promotion or pay rises8 
 
As with politicization, the ‘personalization’ of civil service management functions often 
coincides, with personal connections in recruitment and promotion (r = 0.55), 
promotion and pay (r = 0.74) and recruitment and pay (r = 0.46) all significantly 
correlated. At the same time, personal connections matter differentially for different 
civil service management functions. On average and in more than half of our 
countries, personal connections are significantly more important for getting a job than 
for promotions and pay rises. Moreover, personal connections have least weight for 
pay rises in almost all countries (nine out of ten). Civil servants who use personal 
connections inside the state to obtain their first public sector job thus do not appear to 
be consistently able to draw on those connections to advance to a better position or 
higher pay once hired.  
                                               
8 In Chile, this question was only fielded in the Treasury, with an indicator which reports the 
proportion of civil servants who deem personal connections at least somewhat important for 
civil servants like them. As such, differences between Chile and the remaining countries maybe 
due to differences in measurement. 
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Figure 19. Importance of political versus personal connections in personnel decisions 
(average of recruitment, pay rises and promotions) 
 
 
That personal connections matter in civil service management decisions may, of 
course, coincide with politicization: friends, family members or other acquaintances 
inside public administration may also be politicians or individuals with political links. In 
fact, the incidence of personal and political connections in recruitment (r = 0.47), 
promotion (r = 0.58) and pay rises (r = 0.62) are significantly correlated. Many civil 
servants thus draw on both personal and political networks to get a job, promotion or 
pay rise in the public sector – suggesting personal and political networks might often 
overlap. This correlation is far from perfect, however. This suggests that personal and 
political connections also play separate roles and require both separate analysis and 
reform action. Moreover, personal connections are, on average, significantly more 
important than political connections in the recruitment, promotion and pay across all 
our ten surveyed countries (figure 19). 
In sum, having support from friends, family members or other acquaintances inside 
the state matters for the recruitment, promotion and pay rises of a significant minority 
of civil servants across countries and levels of hierarchy. In fact, the incidence of 
personal connections is more widespread than politicization. As noted at the outset, 
this need not be bad news. Network-based personnel decisions need not have 
adverse effects, but would do if they reflect personal favouritism and thus nepotism. 
The next section thus assesses the effects of civil service ‘personalization’. 
Pg. 32 
 
What works in civil service management  
   
 
2.2 How do personal connection-based civil service management decisions 
affect the behaviour and attitudes of civil servants? 
While research into the effects of nepotism in organizations has recently multiplied 
(see Jones, 2012), there is little evidence on the effects of personal connections in 
developing country civil service management decisions to-date. Our data suggests 
that, similar to politicization, personal connection-based civil service management 
decisions have adverse effects on the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. This 
is congruent with the concern that the permeation of personal networks in developing 
country civil services often equates to nepotism and personal favouritism – rather 
than referrals to better inform meritocratic personnel decisions. 
In particular, controlling for a range of other factors, we find that civil servants for 
whom personal connections were important for recruitment are less motivated to work 
hard, less motivated to serve the public (PSM), less committed to staying in the public 
sector, less performing and less satisfied with their jobs (figure 20). As illustrated in 
figures c5 and c6 in the Appendix C, we find similar negative effects of personal 
connection-based promotion and pay rise-decisions. 
 
Figure 20. The negative effects of personal connection-based civil service recruitment 
 
“Nepotism in 
civil service 
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As with politicization, the adverse effects of personal connection-based civil service 
management decisions do not stop at work and public service motivation, satisfaction 
and performance, however. Our data suggests they also extend to integrity. As 
illustrated in figure 21, personalization is positively associated with corruption and 
clientelism in the public service, as measured by our list experiments (see Appendix 
A.2). Civil servants for whom having family, friends or personal acquaintances inside 
public administration has been important for getting their job have been more likely to 
have received an informal payment or otherwise personally benefited from their 
position (personal corruption), and been more likely to campaign for a political party 
(political clientelism). As illustrated in figures c7 and c8 in the corresponding Appendix, 
personalized promotions and pay rises are, similarly, associated with greater 
clientelism.  
 
Figure 21. The effects of personal connection-based civil service recruitment on 
integrity in civil service 
 
These findings suggest that personal connection-based civil service management 
decisions frequently equate to favouritism in developing country civil services – rather 
than the use of networks to identify high-performing staff for organizations. They also 
provide additional evidence for the aforementioned close relationship between 
nepotism and politicization in developing country civil services. That personal 
connection-based recruitment is associated with greater political clientelism suggests 
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that personal connections are often, concurrently, political connections. Personal and 
political networks of civil servants thus often appear to overlap, with both permeating a 
significant minority of personnel decisions. 
In summary, nepotism affects a significant minority of civil service management 
decisions in developing countries and is, in fact, more widespread than politicization. It 
adversely affects several behaviour and attitudes of civil servants measured in our 
survey: work and public service motivation, job satisfaction, performance, corruption 
and clientelism. This puts a premium on understanding which civil service 
management practices can curb nepotism. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3. Which civil service management practices curb nepotism?  
To curb nepotism, reformers frequently rely, as with politicization, on merit safeguards 
in civil service management decisions, such as written and oral exams and 
advertisements of public sector positions. As noted above, we find that such merit 
procedures are frequently – but far from always – used across countries. Are such 
procedures effective in curbing politicization? We find that – with the exception of 
selection through interviews – they are.  
As illustrated in figure 22, written examinations and the advertisement of positions 
appear to curb nepotism. Both are associated with lower importance of personal 
connections in hiring, with job advertisements exerting a particularly strong effect. The 
size of the effects is thereby remarkably large and, in fact, more than twice the effect 
that exams and job advertisements had on curbing politicization. Interviews to select 
staff, by contrast, appear to have no effects – perhaps because interviews are by their 
very nature personal (rather than impersonal), and leave selection committees with 
greater discretion to select personally-favoured candidates.  
The effects of exams and job advertisements generalize across almost all of the 
countries studied (figure 23). At the country level, job advertisements exert negative 
effects on nepotism in all of the countries studied, while exams exert negative effects 
in 9 out of 10 countries. By contrast, the effects of interviews are somewhat mixed, 
with interviews associated with less nepotism in the majority (but far from all) 
countries.  
In short, formal merit procedures and, in particular, written examinations for entry and 
the advertisement of job positions tend to curb nepotism. Countries with high levels of 
nepotism and/or politicization in civil service management would thus do well to 
expand formal merit safeguards.  
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Figure 22. Effects of public advertisements, written examinations and interviews on 
the importance of personal connections in recruitment 
 
 
Figure 23. Effects of public advertisements, written examinations and interviews on 
the importance of personal connections in recruitment, by country 
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Lesson #3: Ensure that performance matters in civil service 
management 
Civil services vary significantly in their performance orientation: the extent to which 
performance is perceived to matter for promotion, pay and dismissal prospects. We 
find that performance-oriented civil service management has positive effects. Civil 
servants are more satisfied, committed and, at times, motivated to serve the public, 
work hard and perform where they perceive that performance shapes their pay, 
promotion and job stability prospects. Making sure that performance matters in civil 
service management decisions thus brings important payoffs. Formal civil service 
management practices can play a role. Performance evaluations are positively 
associated with (some) perceptions of performance orientation. Their effects 
depend, however. Where performance objectives are not identified beforehand and 
evaluation results are not perceived to matter for career advancement, pay and 
promotion prospects, they have counterproductive effects. The evidence thus 
underscores the importance of ensuring both that performance matters in civil 
service management decisions, and that formal performance management systems 
are designed and implemented well to achieve this end. 
 
3.1. Performance-oriented civil service management in developing countries: 
how widespread is it? 
 
The role of performance orientation in civil service management has been discussed 
extensively in debates surrounding the introduction of New Public Management 
reforms in developing countries (Schick 1998, Manning 2001). Proponents of New 
Public Management reforms point to the importance of rewarding performance as an 
incentive for better performance and motivation in the civil service. Evaluations that 
have focused on performance-related pay have provided qualified support for this 
perspective – albeit with hardly any studies assessing the core civil service (Hasnain 
et al. 2012).  
By contrast, sceptics of New Public Management have stressed the unsuitability of 
performance-based civil service management in developing countries. They refer to 
general concerns over difficulties to measure performance in public administration, 
unintended consequences of performance measures (such as gaming and cheating) 
and the potential costs of crowding out intrinsic and public service motivation (Chen & 
Hsieh 2015). Moreover, they suggest that setting goals and delegating discretion to 
managers to achieve them opens the door for abuse in contexts of politicization and 
nepotism (e.g. SIGMA 2014).  
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Our survey provides evidence which can (to some extent) help adjudicate between 
these perspectives. We thereby shed light on the effects of performance-oriented civil 
service management. We understand performance orientation as ensuring that work 
performance matters in pay, promotion, transfer and dismissal decisions. This, by no 
means, requires a mechanistic pay-for-performance or promotion scheme in which 
performance ratings automatically translate into pay rises or promotions (see OECD, 
2005). Rather, a performance orientation provides civil servants with a sense that 
performance is (eventually) worthwhile – because career, pay or job stability prospects 
improve.9  
Figure 24 illustrates that, contrary to popular stereotypes about bureaucracies, there is 
some sense of performance orientation in all of the surveyed civil services. Civil 
servants on average in our sample, for instance, either ‘neither agree nor disagree’ or 
‘somewhat agree’ that they could be dismissed for poor performance. Cross-country 
variation is significant, however. In Estonia, Chile, Kosovo and Albania, civil servants, 
on average, somewhat agree that they could be dismissed for poor performance. At 
the other extreme, in Bangladesh, the mean response is between ‘somewhat 
disagree’ and ‘neither agree nor disagree’. Similar variation can be observed for the 
performance orientation of promotions. On average, civil servants rate the importance 
of work performance for their career advancement at 3.2 on a scale of 0 to 4. Only 7% 
attribute no importance whatsoever to their performance. This suggests that the large 
majority of civil servants, in fact, perceive their performance to matter at least in some 
way for their career advancement. The share of civil servants for whom this is not the 
case varies significantly across countries, however, from 2% in Estonia and Ghana to 
25% in Bangladesh. Lastly, across most countries, there is scepticism about the 
performance orientation of pay decisions. With the notable exception of Estonia, civil 
servants in all countries are more likely to disagree than agree that their work 
performance has influenced their pay (mean of 1.4 on a scale of 0 to 4, where 4 is 
strongly agree).  
 
 
                                               
9 We measure performance orientation in pay with the extent of agreement to the statement 
‘My work performance has had an influence on my salary in the public service.’ Performance 
orientation in dismissals with the statement ‘I might be dismissed from the civil service if I do 
not perform well.’ And performance orientation in promotion by asking respondents to rate on a 
scale from 1 to 7 how important work performance is for their future career advancement. We 
normalized the 1-7 scale to a 0-4 scale in figure 15. 
“Contrary to 
popular 
stereotypes 
about 
bureaucracies, 
there is some 
sense of 
performance 
orientation in all 
of the surveyed 
civil services.” 
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Figure 24. Civil servants’ perceived performance for promotion prospects, pay rises 
and dismissals  
 
Figure 24 thus plausibly suggests that there is some performance orientation across 
countries, albeit much more so in some countries (e.g. Estonia) than others (e.g. 
Bangladesh); and that performance orientation is relatively less pronounced in pay 
setting (with the caveat that some of these differences may stem from different 
variable measurements). Moreover, the figure suggests that performance orientation 
in one civil service management function need not coincide with performance 
orientation in another. In fact, performance orientations in promotions and salaries 
(r=0.15), promotions and dismissals (r=0.13) and pay and dismissals (r=0.2) are only 
weakly correlated. Introducing a performance orientation in one civil service 
management function thus does not seem to spill over into performance orientations in 
other civil service management functions. The next section will assess the extent to 
which such performance reforms matter. 
 
3.2. How does performance-oriented civil service management affect the 
behaviour and attitudes of civil servants? 
As noted above, the consequences of performance-based management in public 
sectors remain contested. Most existing studies have focused on the consequences of 
performance-related pay (PRP). PRP assumes that the salary of civil servants is (in 
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part) a function of measured performance. Proponents expect PRP to incentivize civil 
servants to exert more effort and engage less in shirking, and to attract and retain civil 
servants who are willing to work hard and contribute to organisational objectives (cf. 
Hasnain et al., 2012). Critics, however, argue that PRP comes with unintended 
consequences: crowding out of public service motivation, gaming, cheating and effort 
substitution in civil service jobs with hard-to-measure outputs and outcomes, and 
multi-dimensional task profiles. These arguments in favour and against could be 
expected to apply equally to performance-related promotions and dismissals. 
Our survey cannot shed light on all potential consequences of performance schemes 
in civil services (e.g. cheating on indicators). However, it does shed light on one 
important aspect: how performance-oriented civil service management affects core 
attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. As illustrated in figures 25 to 26 (and 
additional figures c9 to c12 in the Appendix C), these effects are – where statistically 
significant – invariably positive.  
 
Figure 25. The positive effects of performance-based promotions on civil servants  
 
Having the perception that performance matters for their career advancement, pay 
and job stability enhances civil servants’ job satisfaction and preference for remaining 
“Perceptions 
that promotions 
are based on 
performance are 
associated with 
greater work 
motivation, 
commitment, 
performance 
and job 
satisfaction.” 
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in the public sector. Performance-oriented promotions and job stability (albeit not pay) 
also have a small positive effect on public service motivation; and performance-
oriented promotions and pay (albeit not dismissals) positively affect work motivation 
and performance. 
At the same time, we observe hardly any effects of performance orientation on 
integrity. As illustrated in figure 26, performance-oriented promotions have no 
significant effects on any of our integrity measures, and neither do performance-
oriented dismissals (Figure c12 in the Appendix C). Performance-oriented pay is 
statistically significantly associated with less nepotism – albeit none of the other four 
integrity measures. This might be a statistical artefact, however (of finding, by random 
chance, an effect in one in fifteen regressions), and thus only provides tentative 
evidence for a positive effect of performance orientation on integrity.  
 
Figure 26. The effects of performance-oriented promotions on integrity in public 
service 
 
What can be learned from these findings? First of all, they suggest that, contrary to 
popular stereotypes, civil servants appreciate some performance orientation in civil 
service management decisions. The most robust effects of performance orientation 
across the three civil service management functions are on job satisfaction and 
preference for working in the public sector. Unintendedly, giving civil servants a sense 
“Contrary to 
popular 
stereotypes, civil 
servants are 
more satisfied 
where civil 
service 
management is 
performance-
oriented.” 
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that their performance matters may thus affect job satisfaction and retention more than 
performance or work motivation.  
Second, a performance orientation in and of itself does not appear to crowd out public 
service motivation (PSM); in fact, we observe ‘crowding in’ of PSM for performance-
oriented promotions and dismissals based on our cross-sectional data. At the same 
time – and contrary to the lessons about nepotism and politicization – a performance 
orientation only appears to have a, at best, tentative positive effect on integrity. 
Further analyses would be required to assess whether it might shape integrity 
indirectly, however (e.g. by fostering PSM).  
Fourth, performance-oriented promotions might trump performance-oriented pay and 
dismissals in making civil services work. New Public Management reforms have 
frequently focused on pay-for-performance and temporary contracts as ‘hard’ 
performance incentives. In our data, by contrast, only performance-oriented 
promotions are significantly associated with performance, work motivation, 
performance, satisfaction and a preference for public sector jobs. This suggests that 
reformers would do well to consider performance orientation in career advancement in 
their reform designs. Lastly and most obviously, the positive effects of performance 
orientation put a premium on understanding which civil service management practices 
can bring this orientation about. This is analysed next. 
3.3. Which civil service management practices foster a performance 
orientation?  
 
How can reformers and civil service managers increase the perception among civil 
servants that performance matters for their promotion, pay and job stability? In this 
section, we assess the effectiveness of what has arguably been the core instrument to 
this end in managerial reforms: performance evaluation systems that regularly assess 
the work performance of civil servants. Performance evaluation systems, of course, 
come in many guises: they differ in the frequency of evaluations, whether objectives 
are set in advance, whether targets are quantitative or qualitative, whether results of 
evaluations are discussed, who evaluates, and whether there is a forced distribution of 
ratings among staff in a department, among many.  
Our survey is not able to capture the manifold dimensions of performance evaluation 
systems. Rather, our ambition is more modest: the survey can shed light on whether 
having evaluations has any effects on performance orientation; and whether two basic 
design features of performance evaluations – setting goals before an evaluation 
“Basing 
promotions on 
performance 
might be more 
important than 
performance-
related pay or 
dismissals.” 
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period and linking evaluation results to promotion, pay or job stability prospects – 
shape the effects that performance evaluations have on civil servants.  
In our surveyed countries, performance evaluations are relatively common. On 
average, 88% of our surveyed civil servants had at least one performance evaluation 
in the last two years. This share varies between 72% (Brazil) and 98% (Chile), 
however, suggesting that performance evaluations are almost universal in some, but 
not all civil services (figure 27). Most of these performance evaluations are also 
occurring regularly – that is at least yearly. 78% of civil servants note that their 
performance has been evaluated at least annually, with this share varying between 
60% in Brazil and 96% in Chile. In other words, most – but far from all – civil servants 
undergo regular performance evaluations. 
 
Figure 27. Frequency of performance evaluation, by country  
 
What are the consequences of performance evaluations? As illustrated in figure 28, 
having had one or multiple performance evaluations is positively associated with the 
perception that pay and promotions (albeit not dismissals) are performance-oriented. 
Being evaluated thereby appears to be more important than the frequency of 
evaluations. Annual or more frequent evaluations have an only marginally (and not 
statistically significantly) larger positive effect than biennial evaluations. 
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Figure 28. The effects of performance evaluations on the perceived performance 
orientation of civil service management   
 
While, on average, performance evaluations thus appear to have positive effects, 
these effects vary significantly across countries. Having had an evaluation has 
negative effects on the perceived performance orientation of dismissals and pay in five 
and four of ten countries respectively (though these effects are not always statistically 
significant). The effects on perceptions of performance orientation in promotions are 
more consistently positive (figures 29). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The effects of 
performance 
evaluations on 
civil servants 
vary across 
countries.” 
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Figure 29. The effects of having had a performance evaluation on the perceived 
performance orientation of civil service management, by country 
 
 
Variation in the effects of performance evaluations across countries can, of course, be 
due to multiple factors, including, for instance, differences in culture. We assess one 
set of factors – the design of performance evaluations – given its actionable nature for 
reformers. Performance evaluation systems can, as aforementioned, vary greatly in 
their designs. However, two features are often considered essential for evaluations to 
incentivize work effort and performance towards organizational goals: (1) setting and 
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agreeing on objectives prior to an evaluation period (to ensure civil servants know 
what to perform towards); and (2) giving civil servants a sense that evaluation results 
matter (by affecting their prospects for promotion, pay and/or job stability in some 
way). We find that countries vary in the extent to which these basic design features 
are in place; and that evaluations can have positive or negative effects depending on 
their design. 
Figure 30 illustrates cross-country variation in these basic design features. On 
average, 76% of civil servants somewhat agree or strongly agree that their 
performance has been assessed against a set of objectives that were agreed before 
the beginning of the assessment period. This share varies between 54% (Brazil) and 
94% (Uganda), however. Similarly, on average, 41% of civil servants somewhat agree 
or strongly agree that their performance evaluation results have had an influence on 
their salary, 61% that they have had an influence on their promotions, and 54% that a 
poor performance rating could lead to their dismissal. As illustrated in figure 20, 
however, there is – again – significant cross-country variation. 
 
Figure 30. Perception of performance evaluations: objectives agreed beforehand and 
linkages to career advancement, pay and dismissals prospects 
 
Pg. 46 
 
What works in civil service management  
   
 
Figures 31 and 32 illustrate that this variation in design matters for the effects of 
performance evaluations. Performance evaluations are positively associated with the 
perceived performance orientation of pay and promotions where they are based on 
objectives that were agreed before the assessment period (the effect on the 
performance orientation of dismissals is not significant). In contrast, performance 
evaluations have negative effects on the perceived performance orientation of 
dismissals and no significant effects on the perceived performance orientation of pay 
where no prior performance objectives were agreed (the effect on performance-
oriented promotions remains positive). This provides suggestive evidence that the 
effect of performance evaluations is in part contingent on whether performance 
objectives are set in advance. Where they are not, they may be counterproductive. 
This finding may not surprise: being evaluated against objectives which are set ex 
post is likely seen as arbitrary and unfair by civil servants.  
 
Figure 31. The effects of performance evaluations on the perceived performance 
orientation of civil service management depend on whether performance is assessed 
against objectives that were agreed before an evaluation period  
 
 
We find similar results for a second core design feature: the link between performance 
evaluation results and pay, promotion and dismissal prospects. Where civil servants 
perceive such links, the effects of performance evaluations on perceptions of 
performance orientation of pay, promotions and dismissals are invariably positive. By 
“Whether 
performance 
evaluations have 
positive or 
negative effects 
depends in part 
on whether 
evaluation 
objectives are 
set in advance. 
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contrast, where civil servants do not see a link between performance evaluations 
results and decisions about pay, promotions and dismissals, the effects of 
performance evaluations on the perceived performance orientation of pay and 
dismissals are negative (and the effect on performance-oriented promotions is 
insignificant). This suggests, once again, that performance system designs shape 
whether they make civil services work or achieve the opposite. 
 
Figure 32. The effects of performance evaluations on the perceived performance 
orientation of civil service management depend on whether civil servants believe that 
evaluation results affect dismissals, pay and promotion  
 
 
In summary, our results suggest that performance-oriented civil service management 
affects, on average, civil servants positively. Contrary to popular stereotypes about 
bureaucracy, civil servants are, in fact, more satisfied and committed to remaining in 
the public sector where they perceive that performance matters for their pay, 
promotion and job stability prospects. For performance-oriented promotions in 
particular, we also find positive effects on public service motivation, work motivation 
and performance.  
The implication for civil service reformers is clear: make sure that performance matters 
in civil service management decisions. How can reformers do so? We find that 
“Performance 
evaluations only 
have positive 
effects where 
they are 
designed and 
implemented 
well. Where this 
is not the case, 
they have 
negative effects 
on civil servants. 
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performance evaluations are one important tool. Their effects, however, crucially 
depend on design. Where performance objectives are identified beforehand and 
evaluation results matter in the eyes of civil servants for their career advancement, 
pay and promotion prospects, they tend to have positive effects on perceptions of 
performance orientations. Without these basic design features in place, they can be 
counterproductive. This underscores the importance of good design in performance 
management systems to achieve positive – rather than negative – effects on 
performance orientation in the civil service. 
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Lesson #4: Pay civil servants enough to retain (more) 
motivated staff 
 
How do civil servants in developing countries perceive their pay? Taking a ten-
country average, they are relatively dissatisfied with their pay and do not find it 
sufficient to maintain their households. At the same time, most would find it hard to 
find a better-paid private sector job. Salaries are thus not necessarily uncompetitive, 
even if they are perceived as unsatisfactory and insufficient. Notwithstanding these 
averages, pay perceptions vary significantly across countries, institutions and 
groups of civil servants. This variation matters. Higher pay satisfaction and 
sufficiency are associated with greater job satisfaction and intent to remain in the 
public sector. We do not find significant positive effects on work motivation and 
performance, however. At the same time, pay satisfaction and sufficiency may affect 
motivation and performance indirectly: by discouraging departures of more 
motivated and performing staff, who also deem it easier to find better-paid private 
sector jobs. As higher pay is a significant driver of greater pay satisfaction and 
sufficiency, our fourth lesson is clear: pay enough to retain the (more) motivated and 
performing staff. Where retention (or attraction) of motivated and performing staff is 
not a challenge, however, higher pay may do little to enhance motivation and 
performance of staff.  
 
 
4.1. Perceptions of pay satisfaction, sufficiency and competitiveness 
 
Pay can affect civil servants in a myriad of ways. Advocates of higher pay in public 
sectors point to studies linking pay increases to the attraction of higher performing 
candidates to public service (see, e.g., Nickell & Quintini, 2002; Dal Bo, Finan & Rossi, 
2013); to greater work motivation and job satisfaction as well as reduced turnover 
once civil servants are hired (see, e.g., Esteve et al. 2017; Grissom, Viano & Selin, 
2015); and to reduced corruption, as civil servants are less likely to need to engage in 
corruption to make a living for their family and face greater opportunity costs when 
caught (see, e.g. van Rijckeghem & Weder 2001). 
 
Others have contested these arguments. Herzberg (1987) classically posited that high 
pay cannot motivate staff; low pay, however, can dissatisfy (and thus demotivate) 
staff. Some have gone further and argued for adverse consequences of high pay 
(beyond their fiscal cost). High pay is, for instance, feared to crowd-out the intrinsic 
and public service motivation of civil servants, due to the attraction of less public-
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spirited employees and the greater focus on material benefits of public sector work 
(see, e.g., Navot et al. 2015). Some studies have found empirical support for this 
notion, identifying, for instance, positive associations between pay levels and 
corruption (e.g. Karahan et al. 2006, Navot et al 2015); or, at least, no significant 
association (e.g. Dahlstroem et al 2012, Rauch & Evans 2000, Treisman 2000).  
 
The number of studies which have assessed these arguments with data from civil 
servants in developing countries, however, remains limited. Which (if any) of these 
arguments robustly apply to developing country civil services thus remains uncertain. 
With our data, we can shed light on this.  
 
Departing from most prior studies, we will, in a first step, assess the perceptions of 
pay of civil servants. The rationale is simple: many of the theoretical mechanisms 
linking pay to behaviour ultimately rest not on pay itself, but on the perceptions that 
civil servants have of their pay. Whether pay acts as a dissatisfier in Herzberg’s theory 
depends first and foremost on how civil servants perceive their pay, for instance. 
Perceptions of pay are, of course, driven by pay. As we will show below, they also 
depend on other factors, however. This puts a premium on assessing pay perceptions. 
 
In our survey, we captured three important perceptions of pay: whether civil servants 
are satisfied with their pay (salary satisfaction); whether they could sustain their 
household through their salary alone (salary sufficiency); and how easy it would be for 
them to find a better-paid job outside the public sector (as a proxy for salary 
competitiveness). The three items were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
 
On average, civil servants in our sample are relatively dissatisfied with their salaries 
and do not find them sufficient – but, similarly, would not find it easy to find a better 
paid job in the private sector. As illustrated in figure 33, merely 37% of our surveyed 
civil servants somewhat agree or strongly agree that they are satisfied with their 
salary; and 40% that their salary alone is sufficient to sustain their household. Pay 
satisfaction and sufficiency are thereby relatively closely related (r = 0.54). At the 
same time, only 39% strongly or somewhat agree that it would be easy for them find a 
better-paid private sector job. This is congruent with studies showing that most 
developing country public sectors feature wage premiums relative to the private sector 
(see, e.g. Finan & Pande, 2017). Remarkably, perceived salary competitiveness and 
pay satisfaction (r = 0.16) and sufficiency (r = 0.10) are thereby only weakly linked. 
The judgments of civil servants about their salaries (in terms of satisfaction and 
“Most civil 
servants are 
dissatisfied with 
their salaries 
and find them 
insufficient to 
maintain their 
households. Yet, 
only a minority 
would find it 
easy to find a 
better-paid job 
outside the 
public sector.” 
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sufficiency) are thus far from always linked to the competitiveness of their salaries – 
an insight often overlooked in pay reforms to enhance motivation and performance. 
 
In summary, the data thus suggests that salaries are perceived as at least somewhat 
competitive, but nonetheless not necessarily as satisfactory or sufficient; and that 
perceptions of satisfaction and sufficiency are often delinked from salary 
competitiveness. 
 
Figure 33. Civil servants’ salary perceptions across countries   
 
Figure 33, however, also shows considerable cross-country variation in pay 
perceptions. Over half of civil servants in Bangladesh (52%) and Brazil (50%) are 
somewhat or strongly satisfied with their salaries, relative to merely 9% to 16% in 
Malawi, Ghana and Uganda, for instance. Similarly, the majority of civil servants in 
Brazil (58%) and Estonia (56%) find their salaries (somewhat or strongly) sufficient to 
maintain their households, whereas only one in ten civil servants in Malawi does so.  
 
In other words, in a subset of developing country civil services, civil servants are 
overwhelmingly dissatisfied with their salaries, and find them insufficient to maintain 
their households. Again, this need not mean that salaries are uncompetitive, however. 
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Even in the countries with the least salary satisfaction (Malawi, Ghana and Uganda), 
between 41% and 53% of civil servants would not find it easy to find a better paid 
private-sector job; yet only 9%-16% are satisfied with their pay. 
 
Perceptions of pay vary not only across countries, but also within countries across 
institutions and groups of civil servants. To illustrate, figure 34 compares pay 
perceptions by rank in hierarchy. Most prior studies have shown larger public sector 
pay premiums (over private sector pay in comparable positions) at lower levels in the 
hierarchy (see, e.g. Panizza, 2001). Our data is congruent with – but nuances – these 
studies. Relative to managers (54%), more technical-professional (63%) and 
administrative support (59%) staff would find it difficult to find a better paid private-
sector job. At the same time, more managers than professional-technical and 
administrative support staff are satisfied with their (higher) pay (46% relative to 39% 
and 28%) and find it sufficient to maintain their households (47% relative to 43% and 
27%). Managers are thus relatively (more) satisfied with their pay despite it being 
relatively less competitive.  
 
Figure 34. Salary perceptions across ranks of civil servants 
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This finding provides further suggestive evidence that the effects of pay cannot be 
gleaned from solely looking at pay levels. The differential perceptions across 
hierarchies also provide additional evidence for the need to tailor reforms – in this 
case pay reforms – to the realities – in this case pay perceptions – of different groups 
and institutions within the civil service. This, of course, presupposes that pay 
perceptions matter for the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. That this is, in fact, 
the case is evidenced next.  
 
4.2. How do pay perceptions affect the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants? 
 
As noted in the previous section, prior studies offer competing arguments and findings 
about the effects of pay. Some associate higher pay with greater job satisfaction, work 
motivation, public sector commitment and integrity. Others find no significant – or 
negative – effects. Our cross-sectional data can shed light on these effects in 
developing country civil service contexts. One note of caution about the limits of our 
data is due, however: pay can as much determine attitudes and behaviour (such as 
work motivation and performance) as be determined by them. Our cross-sectional 
data does not enable us to fully disentangle reverse causality – which, for other 
variables such as those related to initial recruitment in lessons 1 and 2, is a somewhat 
lesser concern. As such, our data only provides highly suggestive evidence on the 
effects of pay. 
 
With this caveat in mind, we find that higher pay satisfaction and sufficiency are 
strongly positively associated with job satisfaction and a preference for remaining in 
the public sector. However, we do not find significant positive associations with work 
motivation and performance (and only a small positive association between salary 
satisfaction and public service motivation).10 Pay satisfaction and sufficiency might 
thus matter more for retaining (satisfied) civil servants and reducing public sector 
turnover, than for motivating hard work or performance.  
                                               
10 In fact, the effect of salary satisfaction on performance is negative. As illustrated in Appendix 
c.13, however, this is likely due to reverse causality: more performing civil servants are less 
satisfied with their salaries. 
“The effects of 
pay depend not 
only on pay 
levels, but also 
on the 
perceptions civil 
servants have of 
their pay.” 
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Figure 35. The effects of salary satisfaction on civil servants 
 
 
Figure 36. The effects of perceived salary sufficiency on civil servants 
 
 
The analysis of salary competitiveness adds an important nuance to this, however. 
Greater salary competitiveness – deeming it harder to find a private sector job that 
pays better – is, as salary satisfaction and sufficiency, associated with greater job 
“Pay satisfaction 
and sufficiency 
are strongly 
positively 
associated with 
job satisfaction 
and a 
preference for 
remaining in the 
public sector – 
albeit not work 
motivation and 
performance.” 
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satisfaction and a preference for remaining in the public sector. This need not 
surprise: those who find it harder to get a better-paid private sector job are more likely 
to want to stay in the public sector.  
 
However, greater salary competitiveness is also associated with less work motivation 
and performance. This, of course, need not mean that competitive salaries reduce 
work motivation and performance. Rather, as illustrated in Appendix D, reverse 
causality is likely at play. More motivated and performing civil servants are also those 
who find it easier to find a private sector job that pays better. As those who find it 
easier to find private sector jobs that pay better also have a greater preference for 
leaving the public sector, salary competitiveness may plausibly affect work motivation 
and performance in public sectors indirectly: by helping retain more motivated and 
performing staff members who deem it easier to find a better-paid private sector job.  
 
Figure 37. The effects of (perceived) salary competitiveness on civil servants 
 
 
The effects of pay perceptions on integrity are more subdued. We find no significant 
effects of pay satisfaction and competitiveness on any of our integrity measures 
(Appendix D, figures d2 and d3); but one significant (and theoretically intuitive) effect 
of salary sufficiency. In line with needs-based corruption accounts (see, e.g. Bauhr 
2017), civil servants who deem their salaries less sufficient to maintain their 
households are also more likely to indicate that they have used their public sector 
position to benefit family members, friends or other personal acquaintances (in a list 
“Higher pay may 
plausibly affect 
work motivation 
and 
performance 
indirectly: by 
helping retain 
more motivated 
staff who can 
more easily find 
better-paid 
private sector 
jobs.” 
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experiment; see Appendix A.2). As we only identify a single (albeit highly plausible) 
effect in one in fifteen integrity regressions, however, we cannot rule out that this 
finding merely occurred by statistical chance. 
 
Figure 38. The effects of perceived salary sufficiency on integrity-related behaviour  
 
 
In summary, our data indicates suggestively that pay can play an important direct role 
in job satisfaction and staff retention, and an indirect role in staff motivation and 
performance by helping retain more motivated and performing types who can more 
easily find better-paid private sector jobs. Potentially, higher may also curb needs-
based integrity violations. These inferences, of course, assume that pay, in fact, drives 
the perceptions of pay we assessed in this section. This is explored next. 
 
4.3. Which civil service management practices enhance pay perceptions?  
 
As noted above, pay perceptions ultimately shape how pay affects the attitudes and 
behaviour of civil servants. This puts a premium on understanding how institutions can 
foster favourable pay perceptions. Higher pay is, of course, the most obvious tool. In 
fact, as illustrated in figure 39, higher pay is associated with both higher pay 
satisfaction and higher perceived pay sufficiency, with almost every additional income 
band boosting pay satisfaction and sufficiency (controlling for our usual variables). The 
effect sizes are, moreover, substantively large. Going from the lowest to the highest 
income band lifts pay satisfaction by 1.8 (on a 0-4 scale), for instance. The resulting 
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conclusion does not need to surprise: higher pay can enhance perceptions of pay 
satisfaction and sufficiency.  
 
Figure 39. Effects of higher income and interesting work on pay satisfaction and 
sufficiency (relative to lowest salary band) 
 
 
As figure 39 illustrates, the perceptual nature of pay satisfaction and sufficiency, 
however, also implies that pay perceptions are not solely a result of pay. Civil servants 
are frequently thought to make combined judgments about the range of outputs they 
obtain from their jobs – including their pay, but also enjoyment, identity and 
professional growth, among many (see, e.g. Adams, 1965). Public sector institutions 
may thus potentially shift pay perceptions by modifying other outputs. We find 
suggestive evidence for this in our data. Pay perceptions marginally improve where 
civil servants have more interesting work, for instance. The effect sizes are small, 
however. This has two implications. It implies, first, that fiscally-constrained 
organizations might be able to improve pay perceptions at the margin by offering other 
outputs (such as more interesting jobs); and, second, that pay perceptions are driven 
by – but do not merely result from – higher pay. Pay perceptions thus deserve 
separate consideration.  
 
In summary, higher pay can enhance pay satisfaction and sufficiency, which in turn 
helps retain staff and enhance job satisfaction. Indirectly, it may also foster work 
motivation in public sectors by avoiding departures of more motivated and performing 
“Higher pay can 
improve pay 
satisfaction and 
(perceived) 
sufficiency, but 
is not the only 
management 
practice shaping 
pay 
perceptions.” 
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staff. Our final lesson is thus clear: pay civil servants enough to retain more motivated 
and performing staff. This complements prior research which had pointed to the 
importance of sufficient pay to attract motivated and able staff (Dal Bo, Finan & Rossi, 
2013).  
 
How much is ‘enough’ will, of course, vary. As noted, pay perceptions and turnover 
intent vary across countries, institutions and groups of civil servants. Where turnover 
intent is low or pay satisfaction, sufficiency or competitiveness are high, higher pay 
may do little for the motivation and performance of (existing) staff. At the same time, 
where only few motivated staff could be retained by large pay increases for all civil 
servants (in cases of collective bargaining, for instance), higher pay may not be cost-
effective. Where significant turnover of high performing staff can be forestalled by 
marginal pay increases, however, seeking pay rises may be well warranted.
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IV. Implications for civil service reform 
 
Civil servants are central to making governments work in developing countries. This 
puts a premium on understanding how to manage civil servants in developing 
countries effectively. What can be learned from surveying 23.000 civil servants across 
ten developing countries in this regard?  
 
First of all, that civil service reforms ultimately require tailoring to the realities of each 
institution – and, at times, the realities of each unit or group of professionals within 
institutions. Country-level civil service reform programs would do well to keep this in 
mind. Adapting institutional reforms to local realities has, of course, become a mantra 
in governance reform discourse (Andrews, 2013). As such, this implication might 
seem like old wine in new bottles. Our survey can shed more specific light on what 
‘adapting to local realities’ means for civil service reform, however.  
 
As noted in chapter 2, the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants vary sharply across 
and within countries and institutions. The resulting pattern bears little resemblance to 
conventional wisdoms about islands of excellence in seas of mediocrity in developing 
country states. Instead, gradual differences rather than dichotomies between poor and 
strong performance mark most institutions. Moreover, institutions (and civil servants) 
which score highly in one attitude or behaviour (e.g. work motivation) often do not do 
so in another (e.g. commitment of civil servants to remain in public sector). Institutions 
may thus have strengths in some dimensions of civil servant behaviour and attitudes, 
while having weaknesses in others. Designing effective civil service reforms thus 
requires, as a first step, an understanding of the attitudes and behaviour of the civil 
servants (for instance via staff survey) to be able to shape them for the better. In light 
of the diversity of these attitudes and behaviour across and within institutions, cookie 
cutter civil service reforms cannot be effective. Rather, they require adaptation to the 
realities of each institution or group of civil servants within institutions; and those 
realities comprise both an understanding of existing civil service management 
practices, and of the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants that are being shaped by 
them.  
 
Once these local realities are understood, reforms can be tailored to them. Of course, 
a panoply of reforms might be effective in any given context. Notwithstanding, our 
survey identified four reforms which had positive effects in most of the countries we 
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studied. In other words, they tended to lead to more motivated, committed, satisfied, 
performing and ethical civil servants. 
 
Four reforms to make civil services work 
#1: Depoliticize civil service management 
#2: Curb nepotism in civil service management 
#3: Ensure that performance matters in civil service management 
#4: Pay enough to retain (more) motivated civil servants 
 
Lessons #1 and #2 put a premium on formally meritocratic civil service management 
practices – such as consistently and publicly advertising public sector jobs and 
administering exams to assess candidates. Lesson #3 points to the potential of 
performance management systems. As illustrated in the data, they can foster 
perceptions of performance orientation (and thus ultimately more motivated and 
satisfied civil servants) if designed and implemented well. However, as we showed, 
they can also achieve the opposite where they are implemented poorly. Reformers 
should thus step back from performance management reforms unless they are 
confident they can implement them well. Lesson #4 points to the importance of 
(higher) pay as a tool for staff satisfaction and retention. It matters most where 
institutions face high turnover of the most motivated and performing staff (or are 
unable to attract qualified staff). Institutions would thus do well to look at turnover data 
of high performers before embarking on pay reforms. 
For long-time civil service reformers, these lessons may not come as a surprise. 
Advocates of Weberian bureaucracies have long argued for meritocratic personnel 
practices to curb politicization and nepotism; managerial reform proponents in turn 
have long advocated performance management systems to incentivize hard work.  
To some extent, this is good news: it suggests that many prior reform prescriptions 
have the potential to improve civil services. It is also bad news, however. Institutions 
frequently do not adopt practices that are statistically associated with more motivated, 
committed and ethical civil servants. This, of course, points to the need to understand 
civil service reform not only as a technical design, but also as a political and 
implementation challenge. Our report principally sought to inform reform design. With 
that said, we hope that the evidence presented on reform effects can also help 
reformers make their case and convince others of the benefits and importance of civil 
service reform and effective implementation. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A.1: civil service surveys 
 
Country Survey 
Mode 
Survey Sample  Number of 
Respondents 
Albania Online Population survey frame of the civil service: 
7743 civil servants in 106 central 
government institutions  
3,655 
(response rate: 47%) 
Bangla-
desh 
In-person Informal quota sampling, through chain 
referral 
513 
(note: the survey was still 
ongoing at the time of writing of 
this report) 
Brazil Online Population survey frame for 26,616 civil 
servants in 14 federal government 
institutions11 
2,830 
(response rate: 11%) 
Chile Online Population survey frame for 15,706 civil 
servants in 11 central government 
institutions12 
5,742  
(response rate: 37%) 
Estonia Online Population survey frame of the civil service: 
14,100 civil servants in 53 central 
government institutions 
3,555 
(response rate: 25%) 
Ghana In-person Informal quota sampling, through chain 
referral 
1,645 
Kosovo Online Population survey frame of the civil service: 
18,000 civil servants in 92 central 
government and 38 municipal government 
institutions 
2,431 
(response rate: 14) 
Malawi In-person Informal quota sampling, through chain 
referral 
1,232 
                                               
11 The 14 institutions surveyed in Brazil were: Ministry of Finance, Treasury, Tax Administration 
(RFB), Ministry of Planning, Social Security Institute (INSS), Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Culture, General Audit Institution, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Social Development, 
Ministry for Urban Affairs, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Science and Technology and the 
Attorney General. The survey focused on civil servants on Brasilia where location data was 
available. 
12 The 11 institutions surveyed in Chile were: Treasury, Social Security Institute (IPS), 
Economic Development Agency (CORFO), Civil Service Agency, National Health Fund 
(FONASA), Department of Planning in the Ministry of Public Works, Medical Legal Service, the 
Department for Archives, Libraries and Museums and the National Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Service. 
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Nepal In-person Informal quota sampling, through chain 
referral 
1,014 
(note: the survey was still 
ongoing at the time of writing of 
this report) 
Uganda In-person Informal quota sampling, through chain 
referral 
1,441 
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Appendix A.2. Survey measures of attitudes and behaviour of 
civil servants 
Job satisfaction 
On a scale of 1 to 7, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job?  (Scale: 1: 
Completely Dissatisfied; 7 Completely Satisfied)  
Work motivation (latent measure) 
How frequently do the following statements apply to you? (Scale: from ‘Never’ to 
‘Always or almost Always’) 
I start work early or stay late to finish my job 
I am willing to do extra work for my job that isn’t really expected of me 
I put forth my best effort to get my job done regardless of any difficulties 
Self-assessed performance 
How frequently do the following statements apply to you? (Scale: from ‘Never’ to 
‘Always or almost Always’) 
In my opinion, I contribute to the success of my institution 
Public sector commitment 
Imagine that, hypothetically speaking, you had to find a new job in the next few 
months, in which sector would you prefer to search for a job? (Response options: 
Public sector // Private sector) 
Public service motivation (latent measure) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Scale: ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’) 
I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community  
It is important to contribute to activities that tackle social problems  
Meaningful public service is very important to me  
It is important for me to contribute to the common good  
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I think equal opportunities for citizens are very important  
It is important that citizens can rely on the continuous provision of public services  
It is fundamental that the interests of future generations are taken into account when 
developing public policies  
To act ethically is essential for public servants  
I feel sympathetic to the plight of the underprivileged  
I empathize with other people who face difficulties 
I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly  
Considering the welfare of others is very important  
I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society  
I believe in putting civic duty before self  
I am willing to risk personal loss to help society  
I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor, even if it costs  
me money 
Integrity: personal corruption intent 
Public servants sometimes receive offers in the course of their work life or daily 
activities. Below is a list of several hypothetical offers. Please indicate how many (not 
which) of them you would accept. 
If I were offered a public job in a region I do not know well, I would accept it.  
If I were offered the opportunity to teach classes at university about my field of work, I 
would accept it. 
If I were offered money or a personal present in exchange for helping someone 
through my position, I would accept it. 
If I were offered a better paid job in exchange for taking on broader responsibilities at 
work, I would accept it. 
How many of these offers would you accept? 
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Integrity: personal corruption 
There are many more activities that public servants undertake in the course of their 
jobs and daily lives. Below are four lists with examples of such activities. For each list, 
please indicate how many of the listed activities you have undertaken. Do not tell the 
interviewer or anyone else which you have undertaken.  
In regards to requests and opportunities in your job, how many of the following 
activities have you undertaken in the past two years.  
You have received a gift or otherwise personally benefited from your position. 
You have taken on additional tasks at work. 
You have travelled abroad for your job. 
You have accepted a request from your manager to represent your institution at a 
public media event. 
Integrity: nepotism 
In regards to the relationship between your work and family and friends, how many of 
the following activities have you undertaken in the past two years. 
You have considered leaving your job to spend more time with your family. 
You have discussed with friends or family how reconcile work obligations with 
obligations at home. 
You have discussed with a friend or a family member the advantages and 
disadvantages of working in the public sector. 
You have used your position to help members of your family or friends.  
Integrity: clientelism 
In regards to elections, how many of the following activities have you undertaken 
during the last national campaign. 
You have talked about politics with friends or family 
You ran for office as a candidate. 
Pg. 66 
 
Appendix 
   
 
You helped the electoral campaign of a party. 
You voted. 
Integrity: party-directed corruption 
In regards to stakeholders outside your organisation, how many of the following 
activities have you undertaken in the past five years. 
You helped divert government resources to a party or person with political links. 
You helped your manager with an important assignment for your organisation. 
You helped a colleague with the completion of a task. 
You helped write a report for an international organisation. 
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Appendix B. Job Satisfaction in the public sector 
Figure b1. Proportion of civil servants preferring to work in the public sector by age 
 
Figure b2. Job Satisfaction by years of experience in public service, by country – 
selection 
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Figure b3. Job Satisfaction by country – all 
 
Figure b4. Job Satisfaction by Level of Hierarchy in Chile’s Treasury 
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Appendix C: regression results 
Figure c1. The negative effects of politicized promotions in the civil service  
 
Figure c2. The negative effects of politicized pay rises in the civil service  
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Figure c3. The effects of politicized promotions on integrity and impartiality in the civil 
service  
 
Figure c4. The effects of politicized pay rises on integrity and impartiality in the civil 
service  
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Figure c5. The negative effects of personal connection-based promotions  
 
Figure c6. The negative effects of personal connection-based pay rises  
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Figure c7. The effects of personal connection-based promotions on integrity and 
impartiality in the civil service  
 
 
Figure c8. The effects of personal connection-based by rises on integrity and 
impartiality in the civil service  
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Figure c9. The effects of performance-oriented pay on civil servants 
 
 
Figure c10. The effects of performance-oriented dismissals on civil servants 
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Figure c11. The effects of performance-oriented pay on integrity in public service 
 
 
Figure c12. The effects of performance-oriented dismissals on integrity in public 
service 
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Figure c13. Reverse causality checks: effects of performance and work motivation on 
salary satisfaction and competitiveness, and of salary satisfaction on perceived salary 
competitiveness 
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Figure c14. The effects of salary satisfaction on integrity in civil service 
 
 
Figure c15. The effects of salary competitiveness on integrity in civil service 
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